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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                 
  
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 
  Lillian Kachmar, who held the position of senior in-
house counsel for defendant SunGard Data Systems, Inc. before her 
employment was terminated, filed this action arising out of that 
termination.  She raised a claim of retaliatory discharge in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000(e), et seq., as well as a claim of sex discrimination 
under that statute, and included a pendent state law claim of 
tortious interference with prospective contractual relations.  We 
address for the first time the application of Title VII to a 
plaintiff who formerly occupied an in-house counsel position. 
 I. 
 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 To the extent that this appeal comes to us after the 
district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the Title 
VII retaliation claim and the state law claim, the factual record 
is necessarily limited and we must decide the appeal primarily on 
the basis of the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint. 
 Appellee SunGard Data Systems, Inc. is a computer 
services company that specializes in proprietary investment 
support systems and computer disaster recovery.  On April 2, 
1991, Kachmar, a 1978 Villanova Law School graduate, was hired to 
provide legal services for the parent company and its five 
subsidiaries.  Her immediate supervisor was defendant Lawrence 
Gross, SunGard's General Counsel.  Defendant Donna Pedrick was 
  
 
corporate Vice President of Human Resources.  On December 31, 
1991, after nine months with the company, Kachmar received her 
first and only written performance appraisal from Gross.  In that 
review, Gross gave her a favorable overall rating and stated that 
she was a valuable addition to the legal department.  In fact, 
Kachmar exceeded her set goals for billable hours each year she 
was employed by SunGard, which entitled her to receive incentive 
bonuses.  She was also given annual merit increases to her base 
salary every year she was employed.   
 Kachmar's employment with SunGard was uneventful until 
the Fall of 1992, when a series of events took place that brought 
her into conflict with SunGard senior management and with Gross 
in particular.  The first incident concerned a disagreement over 
the salary level of a new attorney at SunGard, Sarah Armstrong, 
whom Kachmar had helped recruit as the third lawyer in the in-
house counsel's office.  Kachmar alleges that she was misled by 
Gross concerning the available salary for Armstrong and that she 
discussed with Pedrick raising Armstrong's salary to a level 
commensurate with Armstrong's qualifications.  At that time, 
Kachmar further complained to Pedrick that she herself was being 
under-compensated according to SunGard's internal practices and 
procedures.   
 The second incident arose when Kachmar, who was asked 
for her opinion, advised SunGard to give a bonus to one of the 
female sales representatives of SunGard Recovery, one of the 
  
 
subsidiaries, over the opposition of the employee's male 
managers.  She alleges that because of her advice she was labeled 
a "feminist" and a "campaigner for women's rights," terms meant 
to be derogatory.  App. at 15. 
 In the course of her work, Kachmar observed that 
SunGard Recovery had "no real representation of females in upper 
management," App. at 15, and she advised Pedrick and Gross that 
this situation could render the company ineligible for certain 
federal contracts.  Both declined to talk to the president of the 
subsidiary, Ken Adams, but suggested Kachmar could do so.  
Kachmar did, and alleges that Adams then had a "stormy 
interchange with Pedrick and Gross demanding to know why he had 
not received EEO advice from them earlier."  Id.  SunGard 
Recovery subsequently added women to its upper management. 
 The final incident occurred when SunGard Recovery 
sought to fire an African-American Senior Vice President, and 
Kachmar tried to advise the new president of SunGard Recovery, 
Michael Mulholland, regarding the EEO implications of the firing. 
 She alleges she was told that the company "should just pay [the 
individual] off."  Id. at 16. 
        On January 15, 1993, Kachmar met with Gross to receive 
her annual review.  He told her that she was not on "the 
management track" because of her "conduct."  Id. at 17.  Gross 
did not criticize her competence as Senior Counsel, but instead 
engaged in a diatribe against her for "campaigning on women's 
  
 
issues," referring to her complaints about her own and 
Armstrong's levels of compensation, and for "feminist 
campaigning" in her handling of the matter of the female employee 
of SunGard Recovery.  Id. at 17-18.  Following this meeting, 
Gross began to ignore Kachmar and interacted with her as little 
as possible except in formal settings, despite Kachmar's attempts 
to "clear the air."  Id. at 18. 
 Kachmar continued in her position as Senior Counsel 
after her meeting with Gross, though their relationship was 
strained.  In mid-1993, Kachmar further advised the president of 
the Recovery Group that the Vice President, William Baumont, 
should be counseled regarding his treatment of women because 
there had been complaints about his conduct, but her advice was 
received with hostility.  
 In October, 1993, Kachmar sought advice from Pedrick 
concerning her relationship with Gross, and Pedrick advised 
Kachmar to begin looking for a job elsewhere.  Kachmar alleges 
that although she was still employed, Gross offered her job to a 
male attorney in November, 1993, who declined the offer.   About 
two months later, on January 5, 1994, Kachmar was notified of her 
termination for alleged performance problems.  She contends that 
the manner of her dismissal contravened company policy and 
procedure, which required written notice and an opportunity to 
cure the alleged deficiencies.  Although Sarah Armstrong was 
  
 
promoted to the position of Senior Counsel, Kachmar contends that 
in fact she was replaced by a male attorney, Michael Zuckerman. 
 Following her termination, Kachmar sought employment 
with a Philadelphia law firm.  Kachmar asserts that Armstrong 
intentionally sabotaged Kachmar's efforts to obtain employment by 
telling a member of the firm that Kachmar was planning to sue 
SunGard.   
 After exhausting her administrative remedies, Kachmar 
filed a complaint alleging that SunGard, Gross, and Pedrick 
(hereafter collectively referred to as SunGard) illegally 
terminated her in retaliation for her exercise of protected 
rights under Title VII, and that SunGard engaged in a pattern and 
practice of sex discrimination.  She also included a Pennsylvania 
common law claim for tortious interference with prospective 
contractual relations.  Defendants filed a motion to dismiss 
and/or for partial summary judgment.  The district court granted 
the motion to dismiss the Title VII retaliation and state law 
tort counts and granted summary judgment to defendants on the 
remaining Title VII claim of sex discrimination.  Our review is 
plenary.   
  
 
 II. 
 DISCUSSION 
 A. Retaliatory Discharge 
1. Causal Link 
 The pertinent provision of Title VII states that: "[i]t 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [the 
employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1993).  In 
her retaliation claim, Kachmar contends that she was discharged 
because she voiced her opposition to SunGard's unlawful 
employment practices regarding both herself and others. 
 In order to establish a prima facie case of 
discriminatory retaliation under Title VII, Kachmar must show 1) 
that she engaged in protected activity, 2) that the employer took 
adverse action against her, and 3) that a causal link exists 
between the protected activity and the employer's adverse action. 
Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 201 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 590 (1994); Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 
F.2d. 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023, 110 
S.Ct. 725 (1990).   
 The district court held that Kachmar's complaint 
adequately pled the first two elements of such a claim but that 
her complaint did not satisfy the third.  The court held that, as 
a matter of law, Kachmar could not prove the requisite causation, 
  
 
noting that the termination of her employment occurred almost a 
year after the alleged protected activity took place.   
 Cases in which the required causal link has been at 
issue have often focused on the temporal proximity between the 
employee's protected activity and the adverse employment action, 
because this is an obvious method by which a plaintiff can 
proffer circumstantial evidence "sufficient to raise the 
inference that her protected activity was the likely reason for 
the adverse action."  Zanders v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 
898 F.2d 1127, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990); see Jalil, 873 F.2d at 708. 
 We have stated, however, that where there is a lack of temporal 
proximity, circumstantial evidence of a "pattern of antagonism" 
following the protected conduct can also give rise to the 
inference. Robinson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 
892, 895 (3d Cir. 1993).  These are not the exclusive ways to 
show causation, as the proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, 
may suffice to raise the inference.  See, e.g., Waddell v. Small 
Tube Products, Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir. 1986). 
  The district court here analyzed the circumstantial 
evidence -- the gap in time between Kachmar's protected 
activities and her termination -- and determined it lacked the 
requisite proximity.  It then proceeded to assess whether there 
was a pattern of antagonism that could allow a fact-finder to 
infer retaliatory animus.  It found no such pattern.  
  
 
 In dismissing on the ground that the facts pled in 
Kachmar's complaint, even if proven, would be insufficient to 
show the required causal link, the district court took too narrow 
a view of the temporal proximity needed to satisfy the causal 
link element at this early stage of the case.  It failed to 
accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe 
those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  See 
Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 
1990).    
 The district court set the date of Kachmar's last 
protected activity in the Fall of 1992, when her discussions with 
SunGard management concerning the EEO implications of their 
personnel policies began.  This failed to take into account the 
activities that Kachmar alleged occurred in mid-1993, when she 
further attempted to counsel SunGard of the EEO implications of 
management's treatment of women.  If the mid-1993 date for the 
protected activity were used, there would be at most a gap of six 
months until Kachmar's official termination on January 5, 1994, 
rather than the gap of more than a year that the district court 
found.   
 Moreover, Kachmar claims she was advised by Pedrick to 
start looking for another job in October, 1993, only several 
months after her last protected activity.  Her allegation that 
she was told her position had been offered to a male in November, 
1993, shortly after her meeting with Pedrick, would, if proven, 
  
 
show that Sungard had resolved to discharge her shortly after the 
latest activity.  Indeed, Gross' statements to Kachmar as early 
as January 15, 1993 that she was being taken off the "management 
track," which she claims was a reaction to her protected 
activity, would further support her claim that it was her 
protected activity that placed her in disfavor, ultimately 
leading to her termination. 
 SunGard asserts that even a four month gap would be too 
long to allow an inference of causation.  Our cases set no 
parameters but were decided in the context of the particular 
circumstances before us.  See, e.g., Robinson, 982 F.2d at 894-95 
(expressing doubt that discharge could be causally linked to an 
employee's protected activity taken almost two years previously, 
absent the intervening pattern of antagonism); Jalil, 873 F.2d at 
708 (holding that interval of two days between employee's EEOC 
complaint and discharge of plaintiff sufficient to create an 
inference of causation).   
 It is important to emphasize that it is causation, not 
temporal proximity itself, that is an element of plaintiff's 
prima facie case, and temporal proximity merely provides an 
evidentiary basis from which an inference can be drawn.  The 
element of causation, which necessarily involves an inquiry into 
the motives of an employer, is highly context-specific.  When 
there may be valid reasons why the adverse employment action was 
  
 
not taken immediately, the absence of immediacy between the cause 
and effect does not disprove causation. 
 SunGard may have recognized that termination of Kachmar 
immediately after her January 15, 1993 meeting with Gross could 
have resulted in disruption of the small, three-attorney in-house 
counsel's office.  After all, Kachmar was senior in-house 
counsel, not one of many interchangeable employees on an assembly 
line.  We do not know whether she was involved in long-term 
negotiations or litigation that could have deterred Sungard from 
terminating her immediately.   
 By summarily concluding that there was too great a gap 
between Kachmar's protected acts and her termination, the 
district court failed to give Kachmar the opportunity to delve 
further into the facts by discovery.  SunGard relied on appellate 
court cases holding that the time between the protected activity 
and the alleged retaliation was insufficient to raise the 
inference of causation.  These cases arose following a greater 
opportunity for factual exploration than Kachmar was given here, 
where the court dismissed on the basis of the complaint alone.  
See, e.g., Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174 (7th Cir. 
1992) (granting summary judgment because disciplinary letter 
issued four months after discrimination charge filed insufficient 
causal link to employer action); Cooper v. City of North 
Olmstead, 795 F.2d 1265, 1272 (6th Cir. 1986) (reversing after a 
bench trial and holding that discharge four months after filing 
  
 
of discrimination charge not causally linked to adverse 
employment action).  
 We need not consider the district court's secondary 
determination that there was no "pattern of antagonism" that 
would give rise to an inference of improper motive because 
Kachmar alleged enough direct evidence of a retaliatory animus on 
the part of Gross independent of her contention that their 
relationship became strained after their January 1993 meeting.  
 Kachmar alleges that at the January 15, 1993 review, 
Gross told her that she was not on the management track because 
of her complaints concerning her salary, her "campaigning on 
women's issues," and her handling of the female employee matter, 
which Gross cited as an additional example of feminist 
campaigning.  These statements, if proven, would present direct 
evidence of Gross' retaliatory motives because they would permit 
a factfinder to infer that Kachmar was being taken off the 
management track because of her opposition to the manner in which 
SunGard was treating her and other women in the organization, and 
that her final dismissal was just a matter of time.  Such 
statements could be interpreted to show that Gross placed 
"substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in 
reaching [his] decision" that Kachmar had little future with 
SunGard.  Starceski v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 
1096 (3d Cir. 1995).    In concentrating exclusively on the gap 
between Kachmar's protected activity and her firing, and the 
  
 
sufficiency of Kachmar's allegations of a pattern of antagonism, 
the district court failed to make the more generalized inquiry 
into whether Kachmar's protected activity was the likely reason 
for her termination.  See Waddell, 799 F.2d at 73; cf. Andrews v. 
City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990) ("A play 
cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only 
on its entire performance, and similarly, a discrimination 
analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on the 
overall scenario.").  Whether Kachmar's protests regarding what 
she believed was the company's Title VII vulnerability were the 
likely cause of her termination is a difficult factual question. 
 Because the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Kachmar 
would support an inference of retaliation, her complaint states a 
colorable claim as to which she is entitled to further factual 
development. 
2.  Claim by In-house Counsel 
 SunGard argues that we should affirm the dismissal on 
the alternative basis that maintenance of Kachmar's retaliatory 
discharge action would improperly implicate communications 
subject to the attorney-client privilege and/or information 
relating to Kachmar's representation of Sungard.  This court has 
not yet addressed the question of the viability of claims by in-
house counsel under Title VII.  The district court alluded to the 
issue but did not dismiss on that ground.  
  
 
 Those few federal courts that have been presented with 
discrimination actions brought by in-house counsel have generally 
held that once an attorney's employment has terminated, s/he is 
not barred from bringing suit against the former employer for 
retaliatory discharge under Title VII.  See, e.g., Jones v. 
Flagship Int'l., 793 F.2d 714, 726 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 952 (1987); Verney v. Pennsylvania 
Turnpike Comm'n, 903 F.Supp. 826, 832 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Hoskins v. 
Droke, No. 94-C-5004, 1995 WL 318817, at *2 (N.D.Ill. 1995); 
Kocher v. Acer, No. C-93-20132RMW, 1993 WL 149077 at *3 - *4 
(N.D. Cal. 1993); Golightly-Howell v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic 
Workers Int'l Union, 806 F.Supp. 921, 925 (D. Colo. 1992); see 
also Breckinridge v. Bristol-Myers Co., 624 F.Supp. 79, 83 (S.D. 
Ind. 1985) (charging discrimination under the ADEA).  In the only 
federal appeals court case brought to our attention, the court 
stated, "In assuming her position as [in-house attorney, 
plaintiff] neither abandoned her right to be free from 
discriminatory practices nor excluded herself from the 
protections of [Title VII]."  Jones, 793 F.2d at 726.   
 Title VII defines the "employee" who can bring suit in 
broad terms.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994).  Although that 
same section contains discrete exclusions, such as exempting 
persons elected to public office, their personal staff, and 
policy-making appointees, Congress did not exclude in-house 
attorneys. 
  
 
 SunGard concedes that in-house counsel are not per se 
precluded from bringing a retaliatory discharge claim but argues 
that such suits are limited to cases in which confidential 
information is not implicated, which it contends is not the case 
here.  It argues that by pursuing this claim Kachmar would be 
violating her ethical duties under the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Professional Conduct which impose a general duty of 
confidentiality with respect to "information relating to the 
representation of a client."  See Pennsylvania Rules of 
Professional Conduct 1.6 (1996).  SunGard notes that while Rule 
1.6(c)(3) allows the disclosure of confidential information "to 
establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client," the comments to 
the Rule only offer two examples of such disputes: where there is 
a dispute over fees and where an attorney is defending against a 
claim implicating his conduct.  See id.  However, the Rules do 
not address affirmative claims for relief under a federal statute 
and thus we believe they are at best inconclusive on the issue 
SunGard raises.   
 SunGard seeks to bolster its contention that suits such 
as this by former in-house counsel run counter to the policies 
underlying the attorney-client privilege by citing a few state 
Supreme Court cases.  It is true that some state cases take a 
restrictive view of the former in-house counsel's ability to file 
suit for retaliatory discharge.  The most restrictive approach 
  
 
appears to have been taken in Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 
104, 145 Ill.2d 492 (1991), which held that tort actions for 
wrongful discharge are unavailable to in-house counsel.  See also 
Herbster v. North American Co., 501 N.E. 2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1986).  
 Although the California Supreme Court, which considered 
the issue in General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 
487, 490-91, 7 Cal.4th 1164, 1170-71 (1994) (en banc), has not 
adopted Illinois' blanket preclusion, SunGard relies on language 
in that opinion limiting the availability of suits by in-house 
counsel.  In that case, a former in-house counsel filed a 
contract and tort action alleging that he was terminated in part 
because he had spearheaded an investigation into employee drug 
use at a company plant and had advised General Dynamics that its 
salary policy may have been in violation of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act.  In a thoughtful opinion, the Court declined to 
dismiss the action at the pleadings stage, holding that "under 
circumscribed conditions, an in-house attorney may pursue a 
wrongful discharge claim for damages against his corporate 
employer even though a judgment ordering his reinstatement is not 
an available remedy."  Id. at 495.  The Court viewed the 
situation of in-house counsel as being more analogous to that of 
corporate executives who "owe their livelihoods, career goals and 
satisfaction to a single organizational employer," than to that 
of an attorney in the traditional attorney-client relationship, 
  
 
noting, "[u]nlike the law firm partner, who typically possesses a 
significant measure of economic independence and professional 
distance derived from a multiple client base, the economic fate 
of in-house attorneys is tied directly to a single employer, at 
whose sufferance they serve."  Id. at 491.    
 The Court further observed that the professional 
relationship between the in-house attorney and the client did not 
fit the standard model of the "one-shot" undertaking - drafting a 
will or handling a piece of litigation - characteristic of the 
outside law firm.  The corporate attorney-employee, the Court 
stated, "operating in a heavily regulated medium, often takes on 
a larger advisory and compliance role, anticipating potential 
legal problems, advising on possible solutions and generally 
assisting the corporation in achieving its business aims . . . ." 
 Id.1 
 The language on which SunGard relies arose when the 
Court considered the possible limitations on the vitality of 
wrongful discharge claims when brought by former in-house 
                     
1
  For an account of the rise of the corporate legal department 
and its implications for the traditional "outside" law firm, see 
Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite 
Law Firm, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 277 (1984).  A number of scholarly 
articles have addressed the dynamics of lawyer-client relations 
in the organizational context.  See, e.g., Sara A. Corello, Note, 
In-House Counsel's Right to Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 92 
Colum. L. Rev. 389 (1992); Stephen E. Kalish, The Attorney's Role 
in the Private Organization, 59 Neb. L. Rev. 1 (1988); Kenneth J. 
Wilbur, Wrongful Discharge of Attorneys: A Cause of Action to 
Further Professional Responsibility, 92 Dick. L. Rev. 777 (1988); 
Daniel S. Reynolds, Wrongful Discharge of Employed Counsel, 1 
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 553 (1988). 
  
 
counsel.  The Court, after holding that a limited remedy should 
be provided for former in-house counsel "confronted with the 
dilemma of choosing between adhering to professional ethical 
norms and surrendering to the employer's unethical demands," 
recognized the need to accommodate the "values that underlie the 
professional relationship - the fiduciary qualities of mutual 
trust and confidence."  Id. at 502, 503.  It was in that context 
that the Court stated that "in those instances where the 
attorney-employee's retaliatory discharge claim is incapable of 
complete resolution without breaching the attorney-client 
privilege, [a wrongful discharge] suit may not proceed," unless 
"some statute or ethical rule, such as the statutory exceptions 
to the attorney-client privilege . . . specifically permits the 
attorney to depart from the usual requirement of 
confidentiality."  Id. at 490, 502.  The Court noted that there 
are ample possibilities for preserving confidential 
communications, and underlined the fact that dismissal at the 
demurrer stage will seldom, if ever, be appropriate.  See id. at 
489. 
 Other state courts have also permitted former in-house 
attorneys to bring wrongful discharge actions in tort, similarly 
analyzing the state public policies at issue.  See, e.g., GTE 
Products Corp. v. Stewart, 653 N.E.2d 161, 166-68, 421 Mass. 22, 
28-29 (1995) (holding that in-house counsel may maintain wrongful 
discharge action where fired for refusing to violate ethical 
  
 
norms); Parker v. M & T Chemicals, Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 220, 236 
N.J.Super. 451, 459 (1989) (holding that employee-attorney may 
bring a damage suit for wrongful discharge under New Jersey's 
Conscientious Employee Protection Act, as public policy in favor 
of whistle-blowing on illegal conduct overrides attorney's duties 
of confidentiality).    
 The federal courts that have addressed the question 
have cited the important public policies underlying federal anti-
discrimination legislation and the supremacy of federal laws in 
determining that federal anti-discrimination statutes take 
precedence over the at-will discharge principle.  See, e.g., 
Jones, 793 F.2d at 726; Stinneford v. Spiegel Inc., 845 F.Supp. 
1243, 1245-46 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Rand v. CF Industries, Inc., 797 
F.Supp. 643, 645 (N.D. Ill. 1992).    
 The Jones court, although ultimately upholding the 
district court decision that the employer was justified in 
terminating the former attorney-manager of its EEO programs, 
emphasized that the provisions of Title VII must be construed 
broadly to extend to all employees and must be rigorously 
enforced: "since the enforcement of Title VII rights necessarily 
depends on the ability of individuals to present their grievances 
without the threat of retaliatory conduct by their employers, 
rigid enforcement of § 704(a) [the retaliatory discharge 
provision] is required."  Jones, 793 F.2d at 726; see also 
Stinneford, 845 F.Supp. at 1246 ("[T]he Supremacy clause demands 
  
 
that the federally mandated protections of the ADEA triumph over 
the state principle of at-will employment.").  Such an approach 
is consistent with the policy to liberally construe the 
discrimination laws to best effectuate their remedial purpose.  
See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981). 
 We do not suggest that concerns about the disclosure of 
client confidences in suits by in-house counsel are unfounded, 
but these concerns alone would not warrant dismissing a 
plaintiff's case, especially where there are other means to 
prevent unwarranted disclosure of confidential information.  In 
Breckinridge v. Bristol-Myers Co., 624 F.Supp. 79 (S.D. Ind. 
1985), where the defendants' legal officer claimed that the 
reasons offered by the company for his dismissal were a pretext 
for illegal age discrimination, the district court determined 
that while certain breaches of confidential material were 
problematic, "what [the plaintiff] Breckinridge did as the 
defendants' employee is assuredly relevant and pivotal in this 
case." Id. at 84.  It did not disallow the plaintiff from 
providing testimony as to his duties and actions as general 
counsel, and, in fact, explicitly noted that information relating 
to the plaintiff's activities was relevant and discoverable.  See 
id. at 83.   
 It is premature at this stage of the litigation to 
determine the range of the evidence Kachmar will offer and 
whether or how it will implicate the attorney-client privilege.  
  
 
For example, without deciding the substance of the issue, it is 
difficult to see how statements made to Kachmar and other 
evidence offered in relation to her own employment and her own 
prospects in the company would implicate the attorney-client 
privilege.  See, e.g., Breckenridge, 624 F. Supp. at 82.  It is 
also questionable whether information that was generally 
observable by Kachmar as an employee of the company, such as her 
observations concerning the lack of women in a SunGard 
subsidiary, would implicate the privilege.  Moreover, there may 
be a fine but relevant line to draw between the fact that Kachmar 
took positions on certain legal issues involving SunGard 
policies, and the substance of her legal opinions.  See General 
Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 491 (discussing fact that plaintiff counsel 
advised the company that it was in possible violation of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act). 
      In Doe v. A Corp., 709 F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir. 1983), 
the court observed that "[a] lawyer . . . does not forfeit his 
rights simply because to prove them he must utilize confidential 
information.  Nor does the client gain the right to cheat the 
lawyer by imparting confidences to him."  Id. at 1050; cf. Oregon 
State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1994-136 (stating that 
attorney may disclose confidences to establish a wrongful 
termination claim where attorney was terminated after refusing to 
make false representations on a patent application). 
  
 
 In balancing the needed protection of sensitive 
information with the in-house counsel's right to maintain the 
suit, the district court may use a number of equitable measures 
at its disposal "designed to permit the attorney plaintiff to 
attempt to make the necessary proof while protecting from 
disclosure client confidences subject to the privilege."  General 
Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504.  Among those referred to in General 
Dynamics were "[t]he use of sealing and protective orders, 
limited admissibility of evidence, orders restricting the use of 
testimony in successive proceedings, and, where appropriate, in 
camera proceedings."  Id.  Admittedly, this may entail more 
attention by a judicial officer than in most other Title VII 
actions, but we are not prepared to say that the trial court, 
after assessing the sensitivity of the information offered at 
trial, would not be able to draft a procedure that permits 
vindicating Kachmar's rights while preserving the core values 
underlying the attorney-client relationship.  It follows that we 
cannot affirm the dismissal of Kachmar's retaliatory discharge 
claim at this preliminary stage on the alternative grounds 
suggested by SunGard. 
 B. Sex Discrimination 
   In contrast to the dismissal of Kachmar's retaliatory 
discharge claim, the district court entered summary judgment for 
SunGard on Kachmar's sex discrimination claim.  In her complaint 
Kachmar alleged that SunGard engaged in a "pattern and practice 
  
 
of discrimination against females, including plaintiff, in rates 
of compensation, promotions, hiring, retention, and discharge."  
App. at 21.   Kachmar sought damages and reinstatement with back-
pay.  The parties have therefore treated this as a claim under 
Title VII that Kachmar was fired on account of her sex that is 
independent of her Title VII retaliatory discharge action.  
 To establish a prima facie case of employment 
discrimination, a plaintiff must show that she is a member of a 
protected class, that she was qualified for the position under 
dispute, that she was dismissed from that position, and that she 
was replaced by a member of a favored class. See McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 
(1973); Lazarz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 857 F.Supp. 417, 422 (E.D. 
Pa. 1994).  The first three elements of Kachmar's prima facie 
case are undisputed.  The district court granted SunGard's motion 
for summary judgment based on the fourth element, holding that 
there was no dispute as to the fact that Kachmar was replaced by 
a female employee. 
 The district court's treatment of this issue was brief. 
 The court stated: 
 
Defendants have submitted an affidavit of Defendant 
Gross which indicates that Kachmar was 
replaced by Armstrong, another female.  In 
response, Kachmar has filed her own affidavit 
stating that she "trained Sarah Armstrong and 
worked with her, [she knew] her experience 
[was] not comparable to [her] own . . . [s]he 
may have been given my title, but she did not 
and could not replace me."  See Affidavit of 
Kachmar, at ¶ 15.  This is not sufficient to 
  
 
stave off summary judgment.  Since I find 
that there is no genuine issue as to who 
replaced Kachmar, Defendants' Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment will be granted. 
 
App. at 60-61. 
 Had the relevant issue been who was given Kachmar's 
title, Gross's affidavit would have been dispositive, as Kachmar 
did not dispute that Sarah Armstrong, another woman, was promoted 
into her position of Senior Counsel.  She did, however, dispute 
that Armstrong "replace[d]" her.  She contends that while 
Armstrong took over Kachmar's position in name, Michael 
Zuckerman, who was hired as Corporate Counsel to fill Armstrong's 
place, was Kachmar's actual replacement.  She asserts that the 
timing of the hiring and the relative experience of Armstrong and 
Zuckerman strongly suggest that Armstrong became Senior Counsel 
in name only.   
 As this issue arises on summary judgment, Kachmar's 
failure to provide some evidence other than her own belief that 
Zuckerman rather than Armstrong replaced her would require 
affirmance under ordinary circumstances.  For example, she has 
failed to overcome the memorandum SunGard produced dated March 
18, 1994, from Gross to 53 SunGard management employees that 
states: 
I am pleased to announce that Sara Armstrong has been 
promoted to the position of Senior Counsel.  
In just two years with the Company, Sara has 
quickly learned many of the intricacies of 
our myriad businesses and assumed major 
responsibilities in the areas of customer 
contracts and acquisitions.  By way of 
reminder, Sara previously worked on the 
  
 
mergers and acquisitions team at the 
Philadelphia law firm of Dechert Price & 
Rhoads; she is a 1988 graduate of Columbia 
Law School and also holds a masters degree 
from the Kennedy School of Government and a 
bachelors degree from the University of 
Pennsylvania. 
 
I am also pleased to announce that Mike Zuckerman will 
be joining the Company as Corporate Counsel 
in mid-April.  Before attending Harvard Law 
School, where he graduated cum laude in 1990, 
Mike worked for ten years in the computer 
industry, including positions as Manager of 
Product Development and Director of Technical 
Services for a provider of specialty turnkey 
systems.  Since 1990, Mike has applied his 
unique blend of legal and computer skills at 
Dechert, Price & Rhoads, where he has handled 
a variety of computer law, intellectual 
property and general corporate assignments.  
Mike will be handling similar types of 
assignments for SunGard. 
 
App. at 34.  As this memorandum appears to notify those who would 
be likely to refer matters to in-house counsel of the respective 
positions occupied by Armstrong and Zuckerman, it supports 
SunGard's position that Armstrong replaced Kachmar.  Kachmar 
notes that SunGard "waited seven weeks . . . to announce 
Armstrong's promotion to Senior Counsel" and argues that she 
should be able to explore by discovery whether it is a "possible 
pretext."  Appellant's brief at 39. 
 It appears from this limited record that Kachmar will 
have a difficult road to travel to support her allegation that 
Armstrong's promotion was simply a ruse.  However, Kachmar was 
not given the opportunity to test her contention by discovery.  
Although she followed the procedure contained in Rule 56(f) by 
  
 
certifying her need to have the opportunity to complete discovery 
before the court made a dispositive ruling on SunGard's motion 
for summary judgment, see App. at 47, the district court entered 
judgment without giving her that opportunity.  Nor did the 
district court explain why it was denying the request for 
discovery.  Inasmuch as Kachmar has had no opportunity for 
discovery, we will vacate the order granting summary judgment to 
give her the chance to pursue this theory. 
   In remanding on this issue, we do not suggest that 
"replacement" for purposes of Title VII means that every detail 
of the duties which Kachmar performed need be compared to those 
performed by Armstrong and Zuckerman.  It would be only natural 
that duties shift with new personnel, as they bring to the 
position varied skills and expertise that may differ from those 
of the prior occupant.  Nor is salary necessarily determinative. 
 The relevant issue is whether the title of Senior Counsel given 
to Armstrong was merely a ruse to conceal replacing Kachmar with 
Zuckerman, a male.  Because this is a narrow issue, the district 
court may limit discovery on this claim accordingly. 
 C. Individual Liability 
 The district court dismissed Gross and Pedrick as 
defendants in both the retaliatory discharge and discrimination 
claims on the ground that individuals may not be held liable 
under Title VII.  
  
 
  In Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 
F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996), this court in an en banc decision, 
joined the majority of other circuits in concluding "that 
Congress did not intend to hold individual employees liable under 
Title VII."  Id. at 1077; see also Dici v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996).  We will therefore 
affirm the district court's order dismissing Kachmar's Title VII 
claims against Pedrick and Gross. 
 D. Tortious Interference with  
 Prospective Contractual Relations 
 
  Kachmar appended to her Title VII claims a state law 
claim of tortious interference with prospective contractual 
relations.  She alleges that after SunGard discharged her, 
Armstrong telephoned one of the partners of the law firm with 
which Kachmar was seeking employment "on the pretext of getting a 
message to [Kachmar] on an unrelated matter" and "[w]hile engaged 
in this conversation, and for no reason except to attempt to 
interfere with [Kachmar's] efforts to find new employment, 
Armstrong advised the partner that [Kachmar] had hired counsel 
and was going to sue SunGard."  Complaint at ¶¶ 68, 69.  As a 
result, discussions between the law firm and Kachmar were 
discontinued.2    
                     
2
   Kachmar argues for the first time in her reply brief that her 
claim that Armstrong’s telephone call constituted discriminatory 
retaliation was never dismissed by the district court.  We need 
not decide whether the Supreme Court's recent holding that former 
employees may bring suits for discriminatory retaliation under 
Title VII, see Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S.Ct. 843 (1997); 
see also Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 200 (3d 
  
 
 To prevail on a claim of intentional interference with  
prospective contractual relations under Pennsylvania law, Kachmar 
must show the following: (1) a prospective contractual relation; 
(2) the purpose or intent to harm the plaintiff by preventing the 
relation from occurring; (3) the absence of privilege or 
justification on the part of the defendant; and (4) the 
occasioning of actual damage resulting from the defendant's 
conduct.  Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 208, 
412 A.2d 466, 471 (1979); Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 
925 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Silver v. Mendel, 894 
F.2d 598, 601-602 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990)).
 The district court held that Kachmar stated sufficient 
 facts to meet the second and fourth prongs of the cause of 
action, but that the allegations of the complaint that Kachmar 
merely "sought" an attorney position with a prominent law firm in 
Philadelphia did not rise to the level of a "prospective 
contractual relation" as it was too indefinite.  The district 
court also held that Kachmar could not prove an absence of 
privilege because Armstrong's statement was truthful, citing the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 772 (1979).  It thus dismissed 
Kachmar's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted.   
(..continued) 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 590 (1994), covers these facts 
because Kachmar failed to raise this issue in her initial brief 
and it is therefore waived.  See McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 
908 F.2d 1171, 1183 (3d Cir. 1990). 
  
 
 A "prospective contractual relation" is, by definition, 
not as susceptible of precise, exacting identification as is an 
existing contract.  "[A]nything that is prospective in nature is 
necessarily uncertain."  Glenn v. Point Park College, 441 Pa. 
474, 480, 272 A.2d 895, 898 (1971).  We have previously held that 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court requires that there be an 
objectively reasonable probability that a contract will come into 
existence, Schulman v. J.P. Morgan Inv. Management, Inc., 35 F.3d 
799, 808 (3d Cir. 1994), something more than a "mere hope,"    
Thompson Coal, 412 A.2d at 471. 
 We assume that had Kachmar's discussions led to a more 
definite employment prospect with the law firm, she would have so 
alleged and thus we share some of the district court's skepticism 
about the application of this tort to these facts.  However, once 
again our disposition is governed by the procedural stage at 
which the issue arises.  Kachmar's allegation that she learned 
during her discussions with the firm of Armstrong's conduct in 
informing the firm that Kachmar "hired a lawyer and was filing a 
discrimination suit against defendants," App. at 44, may suggest 
that the interaction between Kachmar and the firm passed beyond 
the preliminary stage.  Of course, there is a wide gap between 
preliminary discussions and the "reasonable likelihood or 
probability" stage required by Pennsylvania law.  Had the matter 
proceeded beyond dismissal to summary judgment, Kachmar would 
have been required to produce evidence from sources available to 
  
 
her as to whether her contacts had reached that stage.  Dismissal 
on the basis of the complaint precluded that inquiry. 
 The other ground on which the district court dismissed 
was Kachmar's failure to show the absence of justification or 
privilege for Armstrong's action.  The court cited section 772 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979) dealing with Advice as 
Proper or Improper Interference, which states: 
One who intentionally causes a third person not to 
perform a contract or not to enter into a 
prospective contractual relation with another 
does not interfere improperly with the 
other's contractual relation, by giving the 
third-person 
  (a) truthful information, or 
  (b) honest advice within the scope of a  
  request for advice. 
 
(emphasis added). 
  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never explicitly 
adopted section 772, and we have therefore analyzed the element 
of justification or privilege using the language employed by the 
Pennsylvania cases.  Those cases have not stated that the truth 
of a statement in itself will defeat the tort claim but instead 
have focused on the broader issue of what constitutes a justified 
or privileged interference with prospective contractual 
relations.  In Silver v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598, 603 n.7 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990), we relied on the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court's discussion in Glenn v. Park Point College, 441 
Pa. at 479-80, 272 A.2d at 898, for the proposition that the 
absence of privilege or justification is "closely related to  
  
 
. . . intent" and "is not susceptible of precise definition."  In 
Advent Systems, we stated that,  
When a defendant acts at least in part to protect some 
legitimate concern that conflicts with an 
interest of the plaintiff, a line must be 
drawn and the interests evaluated.  The 
central inquiry in the evaluation is whether 
the interference is 'sanctioned' by 'the 
rules of the game' which society had adopted 
[defining] socially acceptable conduct which 
the law regards as privileged.   
 
925 F.2d at 673 (quoting Glenn, 272 A.2d at 899).   
 In a more recent case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
stated: "[T]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court has determined that the 
relevant inquiry must focus on the propriety of a defendant's 
conduct considering the factual scenario as a whole."  Ruffing v. 
84 Lumber Co., 410 Pa.Super. 459, 467-68, 600 A.2d 545, 549 
(1991) (emphasis in original); see also University Graphics, Inc. 
v. Pro-Image Corp., 913 F.Supp. 338, 346 (M.D. Pa. 1996).  
Because the district court focused solely on Restatement section 
772 which gives dispositive effect to the truthfulness of the 
statement and failed to apply the broader Pennsylvania standard 
which looks to the propriety of the conduct, we will remand to 
the district court.   
 We do not suggest that the truthfulness of the 
statement is not a factor to be considered although we note that 
truthfulness is not referred to in either section 767 of 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides a list of factors 
relevant to "proper" conduct, or in the Pennsylvania cases 
  
 
dealing with interference with prospective contractual relations. 
 The district court will have the opportunity to review in the  
first instance what may be the somewhat differing approaches to 
"proper" conduct in the Pennsylvania Superior Court.  Compare 
Yaindl v.Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa.Super. 560, 573-74, 580 n.11, 
422 A.2d 611, 618, 622 n.11 (1980) (employing the factors of 
section 767 and stating that the absence of privilege or 
justification is merely another way of stating that the 
defendant's conduct must be improper) with Vintage Homes, Inc. v. 
Levin, 382 Pa.Super. 146, 155, 554 A.2d 989, 994 (1989) 
(analyzing the tort only with reference to "absence of 
justification or privilege"), Gordon v. Lancaster Osteopathic 
Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 340 Pa.Super. 253, 263, 489 A.2d 1364, 1370 
(1985), and Ruffing, 600 A.2d at 549 (analyzing tort with 
reference to both the factors set forth in section 767 and 
"absence of justification or privilege"). 
 Kachmar is entitled the opportunity to further develop 
her tortious inteference claim.  Of course, to prosecute her 
claim against SunGard she has the burden of offering some 
evidence that Armstrong was acting within the scope of her 
employment when she contacted the law firm.  See Yaindl, 422 A.2d 
at 625.  We assume that whether Kachmar has any basis for 
asserting this claim against SunGard can be developed at the 
initial stages of discovery.  We will therefore vacate the 
dismissal of this claim and remand for further proceedings. 
  
 
 III. 
 CONCLUSION 
 To summarize, the district court was premature in 
dismissing Kachmar's complaint in its entirety.  First, we 
conclude that Kachmar has stated a prima facie case of 
retaliatory discharge under Title VII, and is not barred from 
pursuing her action by the attorney-client privilege and/or the 
ethical constraints of attorney-client confidentiality.  Second, 
we hold that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
Kachmar's sex discrimination claim and summary judgment was 
therefore inappropriate.  Third, we conclude that Kachmar has 
stated a claim for tortious interference with prospective 
contractual relations.  Finally, we uphold the dismissals of the 
individual defendants Gross and Pedrick.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm in part and vacate and remand the remainder of the order 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
TO THE CLERK: 
 
 
 Please file the foregoing opinion. 
 
 
  ____________________________________ 
   Chief Judge 
